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I. INTRODUCTION
For a quarter of a century, debates over telecommunications policy
have been dominated by deregulatory ideals. The growing force of
deregulatory arguments reflects a confluence of multiple factors.
Technological change has devastated old assumptions regarding the extent
to which the industry is afflicted by natural-monopoly characteristics. At
the same time, commentators in the academy, the industry, the think-tank
community and the bar have developed a powerful critique of expansive
government involvement in regulated industries. This critique is itself
multifaceted, stressing both the ways in which markets often correct
disturbances on their own and the ways in which well-intentioned policies
can or do create more harm than good. Finally, these factors have coincided
(whether or not coincidentally) with the ascendancy of a deregulatory
politics, with Republicans holding the White House for all but eight of the
past 25 years, and the one Democratic President, Bill Clinton, joining in
praise for deregulatory reform. I
Given this potent array of promarket forces, one would expect
telecommunications policy to have followed a firmly deregulatory path.
Indeed, many see that expectation realized in the current policy framework.
These observers point to consolidated ownership of key infrastructure
assets, the eradication of once-central line-of-business and structural-
separation requirements, a shift from rate-of-return rate regulation toward
incentive regulation in the form of "price caps," and the elimination of
many network-sharing requirements as applied to next-generation facilities.
Reactions to these developments, of course, are mixed. Proponents of
deregulation cite the tremendous growth in broadband deployment, the
dramatic expansion of wireless service and the advent of the Internet and
related applications (including but not limited to voice over Internet
protocol ("VoIP"), file-sharing and streaming media), and attribute these
developments to the government's light regulatory touch. Critics gaze on
the past twenty-five years and perceive a steady march toward reassembly
of the monopoly-era Bell System, with Regional Bell Operating Companies
1. For example, upon signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, President
Clinton emphasized that the Act "fulfills my Administration's promise to reform our
telecommunications laws in a manner that leads to competition and private investment ...
and provides for flexible government regulation." See President Bill Clinton, Statement on
Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim2889/is-n6v32/ai_18144964. President Jimmy
Carter, for his part, presided over the Federal Communications Commission's first efforts to
ensure that next-generation offerings remained outside the stringent regulations applied to
telephone service. See, e.g., Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (subsequent history
omitted).
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("RBOCs") merging and acquiring their long-distance competitors.2 These
critics are unimpressed with the competitive pressures exerted by new
wireless and data offerings, which, they worry, are or soon will be
controlled mostly by those who, in their view, already exert oligopolistic
power over the traditional telephone network.
But what if all these observers-proponents and critics alike-are
simply wrong about the state of regulation? For all the talk about a move to
liberalized markets,3 and all the growing strength of market ideals, various
critical indicia suggest that the government's presence in the
telecommunications market is at least as pervasive today as it was twenty-
five years ago. The Code of Federal Regulations contained about 600 more
pages worth of communications regulation in 2007 than in 1983. Expressed
in 2008 dollars, political contributions from telecommunications service
and equipment providers rose from about $1.4 million in the 1989-90
period ($859,337 in 1990 dollars) to over $4.3 million in the 2007-08
period. And membership in the Federal Communications Bar Association
more than doubled between 1983 and 2008, from 1,190 members to 2,462
members. Each of these figures suggests that whether or not policy has
moved in a market-oriented direction since 1983, government involvement
still permeates the industry, and regulated entities are investing in lobbying
efforts accordingly.
Two recent books shed light on the apparent tension between the
ascendance of deregulatory talk, on the one hand, and the tenacity of
regulation itself, on the other. In Government Failure versus Market
Failure: Microeconomics Policy Research and Government Performance
("Government Failure"), Clifford Winston reviews numerous empirical
studies of regulation and its alternatives, marshaling evidence that, from the
perspective of welfare-maximization, economic regulation has quite often
done more harm than good.4 In Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics
of Regulatory Reform ("Creating Competitive Markets"), editors Mark K.
Landy, Martin A. Levin and Martin Shapiro collect essays that address in
2. In recent years, Ameritech, Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company, BellSouth and long-distance carrier AT&T have joined together through one
series of mergers, while another string of mergers has joined NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, GTE,
MCI and WorldCom. See, e.g., John Dix, Telecom: Back to the Future, NETWORK WORLD
(Jan. 4, 2007).
3. The terms "liberalization" and "marketization" are used herein to refer to the
removal of government barriers to market-based economic interactions. As explained
below, liberalization and marketization can coincide with an increase in the quantity and
complexity of regulation in a given market. Thus, these terms will not necessarily be
synonymous with the term "deregulation."
4. CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE:
MICROECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE (2006) [hereinafter
GOVERNMENT FAILURE].
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depth the political peril facing attempts at market liberalization, not only
before but also-and especially-after that reform is enacted.5
Winston insists that policymakers must respond first and foremost to
the imperatives of microeconomic efficiency. These imperatives, he argues,
require fidelity to the unfettered market in almost all cases. The
contributors to Creating Competitive Markets are also sympathetic to
market outcomes, but warn that market liberalization is an inherently
political project. For these authors, "deregulation" is a misnomer, as
liberalization nearly always entails the replacement of one set of rules by
another on the path to genuine competition. Thus, reform always preserves
an important role for government-and thus for political gamesmanship
and rent-seeking behavior, which too often undermine or even eviscerate
attempted deregulation. Each book contains crucially important lessons for
communications policymakers and, while neither is perfect, each deserves
attention as the possibility of broad legislative reform continues to loom
large.
II. THE BooKS
A. Government Failure
In Government Failure, Clifford Winston offers a short overview of
microeconomic research into the welfare effects of regulation in various
fields. The conclusion drawn by almost every study cited, and by Winston
himself, is that governmental involvement in markets, whether in the form
of regulation or the enforcement of generally applicable competition law,
has reduced rather than increased overall utility. Winston makes two
central points. First, market failure is less common, less harmful and less
intractable than supposed by many observers. Second, governmental efforts
to redress market failure are likely to create net harms, or, where they
create net benefits, to do so at a higher-than-necessary social cost.
Winston contends that "[m]arket failure is less common and less
costly than might be expected," in large part "because market forces tend to
correct certain potential failures." 6 For one thing, market competition is
"robust" in that it "develops to prevent market power in input and output
markets from being long-lived and often develops in markets that are
believed to have 'natural' entry barriers." 7 That is, the market itself can
cure market failure. Thus, "the highly competitive U.S. environment has
5. CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY REFORM 12
(Mark K. Landy, Martin A. Levin & Martin Shapiro eds., 2007) [hereinafter CREATING
COMPETITIVE MARKETS].
6. GOVERNMENT FAILURE, supra note 4, at 76.
7. Id.
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caused monopolies to be eroded, made it difficult for firms to maintain
harmful collusive agreements, and led to mergers that ... provide efficiency
benefits.... ,8 Moreover, Winston finds that even those market failures that
do arise "do not appear to create large efficiency losses to the U.S.
economy." 9 Indeed, Winston argues that conditions often associated with
market failure might at times enhance efficiency. For example, cartels
"may reduce costs through shared advertising and research, which may
tend to reduce prices rather than to increase them."'10
Winston then emphasizes the harm that results from government
regulation, an outcome he refers to as "government failure." Assailing
"refusals to acknowledge that government interventions can have costs as
well as benefits,"" Winston points to instances in which "government has
created inefficiencies because it should not have intervened in the first
place or ... could have solved a given problem or a set of problems more
efficiently, that is, by generating greater net benefits."'12 He is particularly
concerned about government failure "when economic welfare is actually
reduced or when resources are allocated in a manner that significantly
deviates from an appropriate efficiency benchmark."' 13 For example, he
faults antitrust regulators for blocking consolidations that would enhance
overall efficiency; Winston observes that mergers can be procompetitive or
anticompetitive, but views the historical record as demonstrating that "the
authorities cannot evaluate mergers in a way that systemically enhances
consumer welfare.' 4 Likewise, Winston cites studies purporting to
demonstrate (1) that government efforts to curb monopolization generally
failed to increase overall consumer welfare;' 5 (2) that trade protections
have generated benefits "fall[ing] far short of the losses to consumers";
16
(3) that FTC investigations into alleged false advertising have raised firms'
costs without facilitating more informed decisionmaking by consumers;1
7
(4) that securities-related disclosure requirements have "provided few
benefits to investors"; 18 and (5) that Corporate Average Fuel Economy
8. Id. at 20.
9. Id. at 73.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 2-3.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 18-19.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id. at29.
18. Id. at 31.
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("CAFE") standards have prompted Americans to drive more, consuming
more fuel on the whole while driving smaller, more dangerous vehicles. 19
Winston's criticism is not limited to welfare-diminishing regulation.
He also faults government actions that produce benefits that might have
been achieved in a less costly manner. For Winston, a key example is the
breakup of AT&T. He claims that while AT&T's divestiture of the RBOCs
may have resulted in efficiency gains principally associated with equal-
access requirements that opened long-distance markets to competition, this
reform could have been promulgated by the FCC rather than the courts, and
without the "large costs" that attended divestiture.20 Similarly, he concedes
that regulatory efforts to redress externalities have created some benefits,
but argues that those benefits could have been captured at lower expense.21
For example, he cites studies concluding that 1980's Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,22 which
established the "Superfund" environmental remediation program, "failed to
allocate .. .resources to the environmental problems posing the greatest
social costs.
23
Needless to say, the findings that Winston describes leave him deeply
skeptical about the merits of regulation. To Winston, the experience of the
past 30 years "suggests that the welfare cost of government failure may be
considerably greater than that of market failure. 24 Indeed, Winston argues
that "the empirical evidence reveals a surprising degree of consensus about
the paucity of major policy successes in correcting a market failure
efficiently., 25
Winston does, however, see cause for optimism for those seeking a
reduced government role. Policymakers "have benefited from basic insights
from economics research about those policies that clearly do not work and
alternative policies that may be successful, 26 and "have been less inclined
to impose significant new economic regulations to influence behavior."2 7
But these policynakers have been less willing to tear down existing
regulatory structures.2 8 To that end, he closes with two recommendations.
19. Id. at 47-48.
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id. at 42.
22. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA) (Superfund Act), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
23. GOVERNMENT FAILURE, supra note 4, at 52.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 10-11.
26. Id. at 93.
27. Id. at 95.
28. Of particular note, Winston credits government for relaxing price, entry and exit
restrictions in telephony and cable television, and shifting to incentive regulation. Id.
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First, "policy-makers should pause and truly absorb the fact that
government generally cannot be counted on to correct market failures
efficiently by itself."29 Second, they must "acknowledge that the few
microeconomic policies that have improved efficiency . . . stem from
market-oriented approaches. 30 Policy professionals, he claims, should
apply these insights to a long-overdue program of paring back government
involvement in the economy in the name of microeconomic efficiency.
B. Creating Competitive Markets
The essays collected in Creating Competitive Markets address "what
occurs when economists' ideals meet the realities of the highly political
market design process.",3' The contributors to Creating Competitive
Markets have no fundamental quarrel with Winston-they appear to agree
(or at least to assume for argument's sake) that market competition is
generally preferable to regulation-but they raise substantial questions
about the specific ways in which deregulation has been pursued. In
particular, they argue that deregulatory efforts have been too inattentive to
the political forces that either prevent deregulation outright or-more
insidiously-subvert and even reverse deregulation after it has been
enacted. Market-oriented policymakers, in the view of these authors, have
failed to acknowledge sufficiently that markets are legal constructs. All
markets reflect an underlying web of legal rules, including those governing
contract, property rights, taxation, international trade and immigration.
Markets in transition from regulation to competition are even more
thoroughly permeated by legal requirements, meant either to preserve
regulation in specific industry segments or to smooth the migration toward
a "deregulated" market. The contributors to Creating Competitive Markets
stress that legislators and other policymakers have ignored the ongoing role
of government at their own peril, and that the result in many markets has
been the de facto collapse of marketization efforts. As Marc Landy and
Martin Levin, two of the volume's three editors, state in their introduction,
"greater success is possible-but only if policymakers fully appreciate and
face up to both the political and analytical difficulties of creating
competitive markets.
3 2
While the essays presented in Creating Competitive Markets are too
rich and varied to be summarized succinctly, the volume suggests that the
failures of deregulation frequently can be traced to two interrelated factors.
29. Id. at 98.
30. Id.
31. Mark K. Landy & Martin A. Levin, Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics of
Market Design, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS, supra note 5, at 1, 12.
32. Id. at 1.
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First, common notions of deregulation-and the word "deregulation"
itself-improperly presume that the transition from a pervasively regulated
market to a competitive market requires only a revocation of the complex
rules formerly relied upon to counter a state-sanctioned monopolist's
power. The volume's authors argue that "deregulation" almost always
entails replacing one set of rules with another, and the new rules often
require as much government oversight as the old ones. Second, because
policymakers have failed to anticipate either the continued role of
government or the implications of that role, they have failed to account for
the political pressure that will be brought to bear by interests opposing
liberalization even after reform has been enacted. So long as government
maintains a central role in promulgating or implementing complicated
transitional rules, parties opposed to reform will be able to undermine or
reverse any deregulatory gains.
In the words of co-editors Landy and Levin, "efforts to create
competitive markets do not deregulate; they redeploy regulation."33 In fact,
argues contributor Peter H. Schuck, "the interpenetration of rules and
markets is so extensive and subtle that the distinction seems to melt away
conceptually. 34 This is so, Schuck contends, because "effective market
design-even when seeking deregulation and increased competition-
requires lots of rules, perhaps even more rules than before." 35
This point is made most forcefully by contributor Steven Vogel's
essay Why Freer Markets Need More Rules. Vogel observes that markets
are irretrievably "embedded" in other social and political constructs-
"matri[ces] of policies, practices, and norms" that structure relationships
among market participants. 36 For example, the Japanese labor market is
"embedded in a political-economic system in which government policies
discourage labor mobility, large firms favor new graduates over midcareer
hires, employees are reluctant to defect from large firms to their
competitors and social norms place a premium on employment stability and
employee loyalty." In contrast, "the American labor market is embedded in
its own system, in which government policies encourage labor mobility,
firms embrace midcareer hires, employees commonly defect to
competitors, and prevailing norms encourage firms to lay off workers and
employees to offer their services to the highest bidder.",37 Under such
circumstances, market liberalization entails not simply the removal of
33. Id. at 2-3.
34. Peter H. Schuck, Concluding Thoughts: How the Whole is Greater than the Sum
of Its Parts, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS, supra note 5, at 343, 347.
35. Id.
36. Steven Vogel, Why Freer Markets Need More Rules, in CREATING COMPETTIIVE
MARKETS, supra note 5, at 25, 27.
37. Id.
[Vol. 60
POLITICS OF COMPETITION
preexisting requirements of one sort or another, but a holistic reappraisal
and reformation of the relevant institutional forces.
Put differently, the term "deregulation" connotes a targeted response
to what is often a systemic, self-reinforcing regulatory structure not easily
transformed by such targeted action. "One cannot simply get the
government out of the way and expect greater competition to arise
naturally. 3 8 Thus, as policymakers have sought to limit government
intrusion in various markets, they have often found a need to replace one
set of rules with another. As Landy and Levin note, "[c]reating competitive
markets is a process of market design, not merely deregulation, 39 and
"[m]arket design initiatives, successful or not," can "embody rules and
regulations that are often at least as numerous and complicated as those
they displace.
' 'AO
Richard O'Neill and Udi Helman offer a real-world example of this
phenomenon in an essay entitled Regulatory Reform of the U.S. Wholesale
Electricity Markets. In a narrative that will seem familiar to readers
conversant in telecommunications policy, O'Neill and Helman discuss how
efforts to establish an open-access regime for the electricity transmission
market became mired in political controversy as disputes arose over the
terms of deregulation. "While policymakers initially thought" that "market
institutions and rules would arise in a reasonably straightforward fashion"
following the imposition of open access requirements, such requirements
"have instead proven to be contentious and at times difficult to formulate
and implement. ' The resulting mass of rules and requirements belied any
suggestion that the electrical power transmission industry was being
governed solely by the invisible hand of the market:
In the United States, the electricity markets have not been
"deregulated" but rather have been subject to regulatory reforms that
promote competition through open transmission access, market
expansion, and efficient market design, while constraining market
power under the Federal Power Act's "just and reasonable" standard.
In our view, the overlay of market rules is not simply a residue of
unnecessary regulation but is a needed framework for the transition of
the electricity industry from the market structures and cultural norms of
the prior era of cost-based franchised monopoly regulation into the
period of market competition.
42
This transition, they warn, "is likely to be measured in decades," as
competition develops in the power-generation market, pricing mechanisms
38. Id. at 29.
39. Landy & Levin, supra note 31, at 21.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Richard O'Neill & Udi Helman, Regulatory Reform of the US. Wholesale
Electricity Markets, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS, supra note 5, at 128, 135.
42. Id. at 150-51.
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adjust to account for new market arrangements and regulatory mandates are
gradually superseded by robust market institutions.43
Sadly, as Creating Competitive Markets makes clear, long
deregulatory transitions pose great political danger to fledgling reforms. As
Eugene Bardach writes in his essay Why Deregulation Succeeds or Fails,
"however benign the motivation, the longer that second-phase [i.e., post-
enactment] intervention continues, the longer it remains a target for rent
seeking and other such distorting forces."" Thus, what Schuck calls "the
interpenetration of rules and markets" inevitably leads to what Landy and
Levin call "the interpenetration of politics and markets."45 If market
liberalization requires government agencies or other public entities to
design and implement a new collection of rules and regulations meant to
manage the transition to competition, then the enactment of reform is just
the initial phase of a political process, not (as is often thought) the
culmination of that process. As Eric M. Patashnik explains in his essay, The
Day After Market-Oriented Reform, or What Happens When Economists'
Reform Ideas Meet Politics: "Rather than a one-shot static affair, market-
oriented reform must be seen as a dynamic process in which forces seeking
to maintain or protect a reform may be opposed by forces seeking to undo
it.
''
6
According to Creating Competitive Markets, though, policymakers
too frequently design deregulatory regimes that fail to account for post-
enactment political maneuverings. "[T]he market lacks a reliable
constituency," and "market participants ... have a strong incentive to focus
on their own narrow goals, leaving the promotion of market efficiency to
others." '47 This is especially problematic, the contributors argue, because
many reforms leave in place ensconced interests intent on undermining
marketization efforts. "Markets," Patashnik notes, are "inherently
disruptive," and "create losers as well as winners. ' 48 While efficiency-
enhancing reforms offer widespread benefits, the benefit per individual is
typically small, whereas the losses suffered by those that were protected by
the old regime can be substantial. As public-choice theorists have argued
43. Id. at 151.
44. Eugene Bardach, Why Deregulation Succeeds or Fails, in CREATING COMPETITIVE
MARKETS, supra note 5, at 331, 337.
45. Schuck, supra note 34, at 347; Landy & Levin, supra note 31, at 5 (emphasis
added).
46. Eric M. Patashnik, The Day After Market-Oriented Reform, or What Happens
When Economists' Reform Ideas Meet Politics, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS, supra
note 5, at 267, 271 (emphasis in original).
47 Id. at 268. Put more colloquially, "'Let's eliminate deadweight losses' is rarely a
winning campaign slogan." Id. at 270.
48. Id. at 269.
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for fifty years, this allocation of harms and benefits renders reform
vulnerable to attack by well-organized opponents.49 Consequently, the
"single greatest impediment to successful marketization policy is the sheer
amount of political interference in the market design process.
50
The contributors to Creating Competitive Markets make a compelling
case that these political impediments have in many cases posed insuperable
obstacles to deregulatory success. "[T]he track record of regulatory
redeployments to date is highly uneven, with at least as many failures as
successes," and much of the blame can be traced to the two points
described above.51 That is, the fact that many markets require significant
oversight following liberalization, and the opportunities for political
mischief raised by such continued stewardship, have led to the failure of
well-meaning and even well-designed reform. As one contributor puts it,
"the passage of bold, market-oriented reforms is no guarantee that reform
goals will be achieved.
52
The specific "failures" cited in the book include efforts to introduce
competition to public schooling;53 to liberalize electricity markets in
California and Ontario, Canada; 54 and to privatize the British pension
system.55 Readers of this journal may not be surprised to learn, though, that
various contributors to Creating Competitive Markets reserve special
disdain for the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act" or "Act"),
56
which is cited as a paradigmatic case of deregulatory failure. In Reaching
Competition Despite Reform: When Technology Trumps (De)Regulation
and the New 'Old' Politics in Telecommunication Reform, contributor
Andrew Rich charts the course of reform both leading up to and following
enactment of the 1996 Act. Rich argues that the Act resulted not from any
public outcry but rather from extensive lobbying by the communications
industry itself. In particular, RBOCs sought to enter the in-region long-
distance markets, in which they had been forbidden from competing since
the AT&T divestiture, while the major long-distance providers sought help
49. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
50. Landy & Levin, supra note 31, at 3.
51. Id.
52. Patashnik, supra note 46, at 269.
53. See Frederick M. Hess, A Market for Knowledge? Competition in American
Education, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS, supra note 5, at 184.
54. See O'Neill & Helman, supra note 41, at 128. See also Darius Gaskins, The
Success and Limits of Deregulation in Network Industries: Freight Railroad and Electricity,
in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS, supra note 5, at 113, 121.
55. See Alan M. Jacobs and Steven Teles, The Perils of Market Making: The Case of
British Pension Reform, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS, supra note 5, at 157.
56. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
in efforts to compete in local markets.57 "Without the public's attention, the
principal aim of key legislators was to find a compromise that balanced the
short-term interests of all parties to the reform., 58 And while legislators
were interested in reform, Rich contends that they were more interested in
51serving the interests of corporate patrons. Moreover, the debate was
hampered by the absence of input from the public interest community, the
research community and the Clinton administration, all of which might
have counterbalanced the role played by private interests.60 Ultimately, the
law that was enacted contained broad language meant to mollify the
regulated parties-a competitive checklist permitting RBOC entry into the
long-distance markets on a state-by-state basis and an aggressive set of
market-opening provisions designed to ease competitive provision of local
service by long-distance carriers and new entrants-but "intentionally left
the difficult telecom reform issues to the FCC (and, less intentionally, the
courts)."61
The idea . . . was market-based reform, but its substance was
eventually distorted and all but lost as the battle for
telecommunications reform proceeded .... The new law that emerged
from this intense policy fight lacked a true deregulatory spirit and
would continue to be mani ulated by dominant industries, especially in
matters before the [FCC]. 6P
The result, Rich notes, has been a process in which parties have done
battle at the FCC over how best to implement the Act's core political
compromises. The FCC has made decisions reflecting its own policy
preferences, losing parties have appealed and courts have rejected the
FCC's rulings, initiating the cycle anew. Thus, "the law has generated more
rules and more conflict between industry and regulators than before.'6
3
Rich allows that conditions in the telecommunications industry have
improved in some respects, but he attributes those improvements to new
technologies-in particular the growth of wireless and VolP offerings-
rather than to the Act.64
Given the persistent and pervasive role of politics in all phases of the
market-liberalization process and the plight of deregulatory efforts that fail
to account for this role, the contributors to Creating Competitive Markets
57. See, e.g., Andrew Rich, Reaching Competition despite Reform: When Technology
Trumps (De)Regulation and the New "Old" Politics in Telecommunications Reform, in
CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS, supra note 5, at 247, 251.
58. Id. at 250.
59. See, e.g., id. at 255.
60. See id. at 255-58.
61. Id. at 262.
62. Id. at 249.
63. Id. at 248.
64. Id. at 249.
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believe that policymakers must be far more sensitive to the ways in which
policy design can shape the political forces that will reinforce or undermine
reform after its enactment. Reformers must "adopt a more self-consciously
political understanding of their roles," must "think like statesmen, not
merely technicians, and [must] follow more the dictates of Machiavelli than
Adam Smith."6 5 Specifically, reformers should favor policy frameworks
that are self-reinforcing, even if these strategies are suboptimal when
viewed solely from the perspective of economic efficiency. "Future
attempts at deregulation must do better in anticipating potential political
obstacles to reform, even at the cost of departing from 'first-best' options,
in order to keep the deregulation train on track.
' 66
One lesson drawn by Landy and Levin is that policymakers must
resist the impulse to smooth out the market's rough edges during the
transition from regulation to competition. Rather, reformers should "accept
the constraints imposed by imperfect knowledge, and limit the ambition of
the market design.',67 Such regulatory modesty will circumscribe the extent
of postreform government involvement and thus limit the prospects for
rent-seeking and backsliding. The more reformers resist the temptation to
micromanage markets, the less intricate the policy frameworks they
develop will be, and the less subject to politicking before implementing
agencies such as the FCC.
The collection's most central point, however, is that successful
reforms must seek to restructure not only markets and industries but also
the array of institutional forces that arise in response to-and come to
reinforce-a particular policy framework. Regulatory systems, the
contributors argue, nurture permanent political alliances among entities that
benefit from the existing regime. These alliances become recalcitrant
political blocs with homogenous, static preferences and close relationships
with the regulators and legislators that oversee their industries. As Michael
E. Levine states in his essay Regulation, the Market, and Interest Group
Cohesion: Why Airlines Were Not Reregulated: "[T]he existence and nature
of regulation reinforces the stability of the regulatory regime in a kind of
positive feedback loop. Regulatory regimes tend to emerge from
circumstances that put most or all firms in the same boat and reduce their
diversity of economic and political interests.'6 8 These static alliances pose
65. Landy & Levin, supra note 31, at 20.
66. Edward Iacobucci, Michael Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The Political
Economy of Deregulation in Canada, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS, supra note 5, at
290, 311.
67. Landy & Levin, supra note 31, at 3.
68. Michael E. Levine, Regulation, the Market, and Interest Group Cohesion: Why
Airlines Were Not Reregulated, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS, supra note 5, at 215,
242.
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a danger to reform, even long after it is enacted. To the extent deregulatory
activity eliminates an inefficient advantage enjoyed by a particular bloc but
leaves that bloc intact, it is likely to elicit a concerted and powerful
response from a well-organized interest with a firm grasp on the relevant
levers of power.
Thus, a reform is far more likely to meet with success over the long
term if it aims to realign political forces in the course of realigning
economic forces. "Durable market-oriented reforms do more than destroy
an existing policy subsystem. They generate a self-reinforcing process in
which the identities and organizational affiliations of relevant interests
change and key economic actors adapt to the new regime. In sum, durable
market-oriented reform reconfigures political dynamics,, 69 It does so
principally by "upset[ting] existing coalitional alignments and caus[ing]
relevant actors to adapt to a changed environment. ' '70 In the case of the
airline industry, Levine shows that deregulation smashed existing coalitions
by opening new business opportunities and creating new market niches.
"[W]hat had been an almost unanimous coalition of perceived industry
interests changed over time as new firms entered and old firms adapted in
different ways to the pressures of new competition.",71 The unanimous
"industry position" on key issues gave way to the diversity of interests
represented by specific carriers with specific business plans and specific
needs.72 The unanimous position of municipalities dissolved as different
cities made differing investments to compete for service under the
liberalized regulatory regime. And even the unified customer position
ceded ground as customers in different regions and with different
consumption preferences faced different options following deregulation.73
One critical result of this political reconfiguration was that traditional
power structures could not act effectively to undermine or reverse
liberalization, and reformers were better able to resist the counter-assault of
those who benefited under the previous regime. For Levine and his co-
contributors, the lesson can be generalized to other regulated industries:
[O]nce a change in circumstances creates deregulation, [formerly
allied] firms diverge in character and interests as they pursue different
strategies and seek different niches in the deregulated markets. These
different firms are harder to organize and align, and the industry loses
political coherence and influence. In such circumstances, as in the case
69. Patashnik, supra note 46, at 269 (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 285 (emphasis in original).
71. Levine, supra note 68, at 224.
72. See id. at 225-26.
73. See id. at 227.
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of U.S. airlines, the deregulated regime can withstand fragmented or
disputed challenges by even very distressed interests.74
Thus, Levine contends that the success or failure of regulatory change
"clearly depends on recognizing and addressing, through institutional
design, the present and future political forces that will aid, obstruct, or
shape its implementation and operation. ' '75 Or, as Patashnik writes, the
prospects of a given reform are significantly related to the extent to which
it "shapes the identities and organizational affiliations of relevant social
actors. 76
III. AN ASSESSMENT
Read individually and (especially) together, Government Failure and
Creating Competitive Markets offer several lessons for communications
policymakers in Congress and the FCC alike. But while these policymakers
should heed the advice presented, they should also take care to maintain a
critical distance from the authors' foundational assumptions.
A. Perils
To begin with, both books reflect in part specific descriptive or
normative assumptions that influence the analyses presented. This
influence is in no way fatal in either case-as explained below, these works
have much to offer policymakers-but it cannot be ignored by those
seeking to rely on the authors' insights.
First, Government Failure gives insufficient weight to distributional
concerns as appropriate drivers of policy analysis. Winston makes clear
that he is interested only in overall welfare, not in issues relating to
equitable distribution of resources.77 Thus, for example, he complains that
mine safety regulations produce more cost than benefit, without addressing
just who bears those costs and benefits, and how they would be reallocated
if the existing regulations were revoked.78 He issues the same complaint
regarding airline noise mandates, with the same disregard for the allocation
of costs and benefits. 79 But Winston's aggressive indifference to
distributional concerns is most vividly illustrated by his brief discussion of
"environmental justice." Winston notes that Hispanics and African
Americans are more likely than Caucasians to live in areas where pollution
is suspected of posing health concerns, but dismisses these concerns by
74. Id. at 242.
75. Id. at 216.
76. Patashnik, supra note 46, at 272 (emphasis in original).
77. GOVERNMENT FAILURE, supra note 4, at 10.
78. Id. at 39.
79. Id. at 46.
Number 31
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
explaining that such "sorting" has "lowered housing prices for the poor-a
benefit that could dissipate if improvements in air quality cause wealthier
people to move in and drive up rents for residents who do not own a
home. 8°
Winston is not alone in defining the aims of public policy exclusively
in terms of overall welfare-maximization. Many believe that regulation
should be concerned first and foremost with efficiency, and that all
distributional concerns are best accounted for in the generally applicable
taxation system.1 Whatever its merits from an economic perspective,
though, this approach is likely to prejudge some of the key issues in
telecommunications policy. To take the most prominent example, the
foundational purpose of the universal service regime is to effectuate wealth
transfers from some subscribers (consumers of interstate
telecommunications services, private-carriage telecommunications and
interconnected VolP) to others (as of this writing, principally those living
in rural, insular and other high-cost areas). Critics concerned only with
efficiency would write off such cross-subsidies as the inefficient result of
political rent-seeking by powerful interests.82 This analysis might be
accurate, but it begs the most relevant questions from the perspective of
public policy, which are whether universal service gives rise to positive
externalities that benefit all users-rural, urban, rich and poor-alike, and
whether distributional concerns in their own right require such service even
where it is inefficient. If either question can be answered affirmatively,
then government subsidies can be justified as a matter of policy, rather than
merely being explained away as a matter of politics. If not-but only if
not-then the subsidy must be explained as a matter of politics divorced
from public policy. A single-minded focus on efficiency, in short, assumes
that which must be proved. However they might ultimately come down on
the issues, communications policymakers should not fall into the same trap.
Second, in his effort to advocate the merits of the unfettered market,
Winston fails to grapple fully with the possibility of actual, persistent
market failure. Winston's case, sadly, is marred by repeated instances in
which he departs from the empirical record and relies on tenuous claims in
an effort to deny categorically the value of public action. He argues, for
example, that mine owners have "a strong financial incentive" to keep their
mines safe, because miners are paid a premium for the risks of mine work.
Thus, he suggests, owners will seek to prevent accidents that might
80. Id. at 78.
81. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 106 (1978); Robert H. Frank, Why is
Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, in COsT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC,
AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 81 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001).
82. See lacobucci, Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 66, at 303-04.
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"increase the perceived risks to health from working in a mine. Perhaps
so. But perhaps mine owners, having entered into their contracts with
workers, will assume that future catastrophes are already priced into the
labor market and act simply to minimize their other safety-related costs.
That instance is hardly unique. Winston cites a study showing that
dolphin-safe tuna labeling requirements had a positive effect, but dismisses
the role of the requirements themselves by suggesting, without any support,
that "eco-labeling was driven by market forces rather than government
policy."'84 He cites another study stating that the benefits of seatbelt
mandates and related requirements were "completely offset by drivers
taking more risks,, 85 but does not address the extent to which the additional
risk-taking was caused by the new safety requirement. There is some
evidence that additional protections prompt some individuals to act more
recklessly. 6 But unless the additional risk-taking can be traced exclusively
to the new safety measures-an issue he does not address-even more
deaths and injuries would presumably have resulted absent the new
requirements. He discusses yet another study suggesting that prescription
drug requirements "may give patients a false sense of safety and induce
them to consume stronger medicine to obtain the benefits of more
aggressive treatment," 87 but provides no evidence for this supposition, nor
does he suggest that the study's author provided any such support. In short,
where the data does not prove as much, Winston often asks the reader to
assume with him that government involvement is either unnecessary or
harmful.
Of course, to point out these weaknesses is not to doubt the
superiority of the market over regulation in most cases. As co-author Bryan
Tramont and I have argued with respect to telecommunications:
"[C]ompetitive markets generally do far more than regulation to place new
technologies at the disposal of consumers. Experience has shown that when
providers have both the incentive and the ability to compete for consumers'
communications dollars, they will develop and deploy the technologies that
the people demand.,8 8 Nevertheless, Winston's missteps underscore the
importance of assessing markets in their particulars, and remaining open-
minded to the possibility of market failure. To be sure, the once-dominant
assumption that telephony is throughout the country a classic natural
83. GOVERNMENT FAILURE, supra note 4, at 39.
84. Id. at 34.
85. Id. at 37.
86 See Sam Peltzman, The Effects ofAutomobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON.
677 (1975).
87. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
88. Bryan N. Tramont & Russell P. Hanser, Facing Tomorrow's Challenges: Looking
Forward, Looking Back, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS i, iv-v (2007).
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monopoly has rightly been laid to rest: the local and long-distance networks
alike are characterized by numerous competing providers in the great
majority of geographic markets, competing against one another using a
variety of platforms, including not only traditional copper wires but also
fiber-optic cables, coaxial plant, licensed and unlicensed wireless spectrum,
power lines and satellites. Further, the next-generation digital broadband
networks that are replacing analog narrowband facilities appear to offer
even greater opportunities for competitive deployment, offering as they do
substantial revenue opportunities associated with the voice/video/high-
speed data "triple play." But the prospect of natural monopoly remains real
in specific geographic and product markets-for example, in particularly
rural areas still served by a single independent incumbent local exchange
carrier ("ILEC")-and policymakers should not overlook this prospect.
Furthermore, even absent natural monopoly, there are some problems
the market will not address. As Tramont and I argued, "markets can fail
where needs are felt by only a relatively small number of consumers, or
where services involve costs or benefits not borne by the purchaser (i.e.,
where there exist economic 'externalities')., 89 Such failures, we suggested,
justify a government role in ensuring that the telecommunications market
meets the needs of Americans with disabilities and addressing the needs of
law enforcement with regard to the interception of communications sent
over next-generation networks.90
Third, communications policymakers will want to sift carefully
through the criticisms leveled against the 1996 Act by Rich and Creating
Competitive Markets' other contributors. In some respects, the criticism is
warranted: the Act did indeed leave great power in the FCC's hands, and it
appears that the FCC did in fact over-reach on more than one occasion. A
central example cited by Rich is the Act's unbundled network elements
provisions, which directed the FCC to make parts of the ILECs' networks
available for use by competitors at cost-based rates but failed to provide
much guidance about which elements were to be made available and how
the rates would be set. The FCC interpreted these requirements broadly,
initially finding that virtually all of the network was subject to unbundling,
and at extremely low rates based on "long-run total element incremental
costs," or "TELRIC." These rules were subject to almost eight years of
litigation and revision. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the TELRIC
methodology in 2002,9' but FCC findings on the scope of unbundling were
repeatedly narrowed until finally upheld in court in 2006.92 Here, whatever
89. Id. at vii (2007).
90. Id.
91. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 523 (2002).
92. See Covad Commc'ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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one thinks of the underlying policy choices, Congress's failure to provide
additional clarity harmed consumers and providers alike.
In other areas, though, the Act deserves some credit for promoting
competition. For example, Rich's effort to divorce the success of wireless
and VolP offerings from Congress's decisions is unfair. The wireless
industry has succeeded in significant part because it has been immunized in
many respects from both federal and state regulation; that immunity stems
from legislation enacted in 1993 and from Congress's decision in 1996 to
leave the 1993 regime in place. VolP services could not have succeeded but
for the tremendous growth in broadband deployment in recent years.93 That
growth surely has resulted first and foremost from technological advance,
but it also can be attributed in significant part to the 1996 Act. The Act
directed the Commission to "encourage the deployment on a reasonable
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans. . . by utilizing.., price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance,
measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market,
or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure
investment," 94  and limited the FCC's ability to regulate
telecommunications offerings that involve information processing. Seizing
on these directives, the FCC has significantly pared back regulations that it
found had inhibited investment in next-generation networks. 95
93. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 9.3 (recognizing that "interconnected voice over Internet
protocol" offerings permitting communications with traditional telephone networks will
generally rely on broadband connection at end user's location). According to the FCC's
most recent figures, as of June 30, 2007, there were more than 100 million "lines" in service
in the United States offering speeds of 200 kilobits per second in at least one direction.
These included "lines" provisioned over wireline, cable, wireless, fiber, satellite, powerline,
and other platforms. In December 1999 - the earliest period for which the FCC has figures
available - there were just over 2.75 million such lines in service. See Industry Analysis
and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Federal Communications
Commission, High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of June 30, 2007 at Table 1
(March 2008), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC280906A1.pdf; Industry Analysis
and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Federal Communications
Commission, High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of June 30, 2003 at Table 1
(Dec. 2003), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-
StateLink/lAD/hspd 1203.pdf.
94. See 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
95. See, e.g., Petition of AT&T Inc. for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from
Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Its Broadband Services; Petition of
BellSouth Corporation for Forbearance Under Section 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and
Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Its Broadband Services, 22 FCC Rcd 18705
(2007); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd 14853 (2005) (subsequent history omitted); Review of the Section
251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Deployment of
Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 19 FCC Rcd 15856
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Further, while Winston understates the prospect of natural monopoly,
Creating Competitive Market's contributors in some cases appear to give
that prospect too much credence in the context of communications
regulation. Vogel, for example, notes that incumbents' control of the
critical infrastructure in Britain necessitated a continuing governmental role
in communications deregulation.96 Similarly, O'Neil and Helman assume
that telecommunications liberalization requires open-access mandates, and
Bardach agrees.97 But the recent history of American telecommunications
points to a future of intermodal competition, in which wireline carriers,
cable operators, wireless providers, satellite companies and others compete
against one another using their own networks, with little or no reliance on
government-mandated access to other providers' networks. This
competition--due in part to the 1996 Act's efforts to eradicate stultifying
line-of-business restrictions-undermines claims that ongoing intensive
government stewardship of the communications market is indisputably
necessary.98
Finally, these two books do not fully address what may ultimately be
the most pressing question for decision-makers who are persuaded by their
core messages: just how far from the ideal framework should policymakers
be willing to veer for the sake of political sustainability? Should
policymakers pursue any framework that would be preferable to the
existing regime, however suboptimal it might be, so long as the sacrifice is
deemed necessary to ensure the reform's longevity? If politics and policy
were static, one would assume that the answer would be "yes"--that once
decisionmakers have determined what sacrifices are necessary, they should
take the proverbial "half a loaf' and institute partial reform. But policy and
(2004); Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, 19 FCC Rcd 20293 (2004); Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations
of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services
Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-
147, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 FCC Rcd 16978 (2003) (subsequent history omitted); Review of the Section 251
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of
Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 18 FCC Rcd 16978
(2003) (subsequent history omitted).
96. Vogel, supra note 36, at 34-35.
97. O'Neill & Helman, supra note 41, at 134; Bardach, supra note 44, at 337.
98. Furthermore, while Rich laments the overall increase in consumers'
communications-related spending since the Act, this increase is to be celebrated if
consumers are getting more value from their dollars; without information on what is being
purchased, claims about overall spending tell us little. See, e.g., lacobucci, Trebilcock &
Winter, supra note 66, at 300-301.
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politics are not static. As policy failures become more and more obvious to
the public, attention is focused and political pressure mounts, bolstering the
prospects for more aggressive reform. Thus, an effort to compromise today
may in fact undercut the prospect for a better outcome tomorrow.
Conversely, a refusal to cooperate "today" on this basis could prolong
inefficiency and visit real harm on the affected parties. Savvy decision
makers must account for the dynamic interrelation between politics and
policy and the importance of timing reform to maximize effectiveness.
B. Promise
Notwithstanding the criticisms leveled above, Government Failure
and Creating Competitive Markets are extremely valuable works that will
reward careful readers. Communications policymakers should heed their
lessons.
First, of course, by highlighting the harms that can be wreaked by
well-intentioned government interventions, these books remind
policymakers of the exacting scrutiny that should be applied to proposals
for expanding the government's role in communications markets. The two
volumes underscore not only the costs attending regulation itself but also
the costs of the market-creating rules that attend liberalization; in doing so,
they present a more comprehensive argument than is typically found in
most policy advocacy. Together, these volumes counsel not only
deregulation, but a specific type of deregulation-namely, deregulation that
minimizes postreform government involvement in market-making efforts.
Government Failure urges deregulation, but Creating Competitive Markets
suggests that the choice to further liberalize communications markets
would be only the first of many relevant decisions. Policymakers seeking
further liberalization face a choice between rules that subject market
participants to the rough-and-tumble of competition and rules that carefully
calibrate the transition, offering protections from this tumult along the way.
The contributors to Creating Competitive Markets demonstrate that even if
the latter choice were preferable on efficiency grounds, there are strong
reasons to consider the former, which will minimize the opportunities for
rent-seeking within, and/or reversal of, the new policy regime. In short, in
the process of creating competitive communications markets, policymakers
should resist the temptation to "perfect" those markets using mechanisms
that keep the government at the center of economic interactions.
Second, Government Failure and (especially) Creating Competitive
Markets highlight the importance of ensuring that deregulatory reforms are
general in their aims and specific in the means they employ to fulfill those
aims. Deregulators seeking to ward off the rent-seeking activity that attends
"second-phase" regulatory intervention should work to minimize the need
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for such second-stage activity. Perhaps the best way to do this is to shun
efforts to micromanage market transition in favor of modest reform, and to
limit as far as possible the postenactment role played by agencies and other
implementing bodies. Discrete reforms should minimize the scope of
second-phase oversight, and detailed instructions should minimize the
power wielded by the implementing agency.
Indeed, the principal flaw of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
may have been that it flouted both of these precepts. The Act codified
immensely ambitious objectives, but was maddeningly vague about how
they were to be achieved. Thus, the Act set out a litany of specific market-
opening measures to be applied to incumbent local exchange carriers
(mandating, among other things, competitors' access to unbundled network
elements, interconnection and resale at state-mandated rates), 99 but offered
precious little guidance on critical issues such as how the states were to set
those rates, leading to years of litigation ultimately reaching the Supreme
Court. So too, the Act set forth a detailed fourteen-point "competitive
checklist" listing obligations an RBOC would need to fulfill before being
permitted to offer in-region long-distance service in a particular state,' 0 but
failed to clarify many terms in sufficient detail, resulting in repeated
instances in which observers were unable to divine whether a particular
application would be granted or denied-and, again, in extensive litigation.
The books reviewed here suggest that reform would have worked better
had the reformers adopted fewer requirements and been more forthcoming
about how those requirements would be satisfied, thus minimizing the
prospects for postenactment political interference with deregulatory ends.
Those contemplating new telecommunications legislation would do well to
heed these lessons.
Third, Government Failure and Creating Competitive Markets seem
to support a functional approach to regulation based on the service
provided rather than the identity of the provider in establishing regulatory
categories. In his analysis of the airline industry, Creating Competitive
Markets contributor Michael E. Levine notes that "deregulation generated
markets that looked like other real-world, mostly competitive markets,
warts and all."''° As described above, this "warts and all" competition
forced providers to differentiate themselves from one another, and in so
doing helped to dislodge existing alliances that might otherwise have
subverted reform efforts. Interplatform competition could have a similar
effect in telecommunications, where regulatory entitlements and subsidies
have previously led to entrenched, ossified coalitions that have arguably
99. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2000).
100. 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B) (2000).
101. Levine, supra note 68, at 236.
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foreclosed efficient reform in areas ranging from intercarrier compensation
to universal service to video entry. It is often said that the 1996 Act
eliminated line-of-business restrictions, permitting providers to enter one
another's markets, but more work remains to be done. For example, states
and localities have delayed wireline providers' entry into the video
markets, the FCC has declined to afford providers of interconnected VoIP
services direct access to telephone numbers and interconnection rights and
ILECs' telephony offerings are subject to far more regulation than
incumbent cable providers' offerings. Whatever the merits of the
underlying policy questions, one lesson of Creating Competitive Markets is
that a market in which all compete against all is politically superior to a
market in which roles are assigned by regulation: the former will disrupt
existing coalitions and diminish the prospects for back-sliding, while the
latter will preserve political preferences based on a party's long-standing
interests. Put differently, even if convergence was not an ideal outcome
from a policy perspective (and there are many reasons to believe that it is),
it is likely an ideal outcome politically, in that policies promoting
convergence will be more durable than their alternatives.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some twelve years after the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
telecommunications policy is marked by extensive regulation, at least some
of which reflects outmoded assumptions about the nature of the market and
the technology that drives its development. As networks and market
structures continue to evolve, the existing communications policy
framework is likely to come under increasing scrutiny and increasing
pressure for reform. Government Failure and Creating Competitive
Markets offer important lessons for how such reform should be
implemented. Those charged with drafting and implementing it would do
well to consult these volumes with open, if critical, minds.
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